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Electricity distribution is a primary candidate for regulation since it is a natural monopoly whose 
costs it would be inefficient to duplicate in a competitive market. In the UK since privatisation of 
the electricity industry in 1990, this regulation has emphasised incentives for cost efficiency 
through the use of RPI–X price capping applied to 14 regional distribution businesses. The paper 
examines the issues that have arisen in implementation, including the practice of bench-marking 
the operating and capital expenditures of different companies. It analyses how the price set at the 
beginning of each review period depends on the determination of cost yardsticks, the weighted 
average cost of capital and the regulatory asset base of the companies. The analytical model is used 
to evaluate Ofgem’s 1999 Distribution Price Control Review and compares it with other European 
distribution price regulations. 
JEL classification: L51, L94. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Incentive regulation and market liberalisation of electricity supply are spreading 
world-wide, having been pioneered in the UK (Pollitt, 1997). This paper takes up 
the UK story 10 years after the privatisation of the industry, in order to examine 
the regulatory issues that have emerged in the second phase of price control 
reviews, particularly as applied to the distribution sector of the industry. The 12 
                                                                                                                                    
*Department of Economics, Loughborough University. 
The original version of this paper was presented at the Network of Industrial Economists Conference in 
December 1998, from which helpful comments, along with those of two anonymous referees, are 
acknowledged. Fiscal Studies 
234 
distribution companies in England and Wales have been the primary focus of the 
evolution of RPI–X price-cap regulation and they have been regarded as bench-
mark cases for electricity regulation around the world. Distribution of electricity 
is frequently organised through regional monopoly franchises, and regulators are 
therefore naturally drawn to the idea of using yardstick comparisons in 
reviewing the price controls applying to such companies. In setting X factors for 
price caps, electricity regulators may wish to look outside the industry at national 
performance in multifactor productivity growth in order to determine the initial 
incentive mechanism, but, sooner or later, customer pressure is likely to draw 
attention to the performance of the companies themselves. Regulators must then 
be prepared to make efficiency and productivity comparisons amongst the 
companies and use these to determine how price caps will be adjusted. The ways 
in which this development has affected the regulatory price controls in England 
and Wales between 1995 and 1999 are the concern of this paper. 
Substantial work has already been done in evaluating the success of the UK 
privatisation programme for electricity generation and transmission, notably by 
Newbery and Pollitt (1997). These authors find that the net benefits of 
privatisation of the Central Electricity Generating Board in England and Wales, 
including the effect of changing fuel mix on meeting environmental objectives, 
were significantly positive. Nevertheless, the final impact of electricity 
privatisation on consumers must equally reflect the consequences of regulatory 
incentives and network utility responses to these, since about 40 per cent of the 
final supply price of electricity arises in the regulated sectors of distribution and 
transmission. 
This paper concentrates on the regulated segment of the price of electricity, 
covering, in particular, the distribution function of the electricity network 
services providers in England and Wales and the price control ideas that are 
outlined in Ofgem (1999a and 1999b). It begins by summarising briefly some 
ideas from the regulation literature, before examining the methods used by the 
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) in arriving at the 1999 controls. 
The paper goes on to review the evidence on comparative efficiency and 
productivity performance, and examines Ofgem’s own published work on this 
yardstick issue. It then reviews the decisions of Ofgem about the manner in 
which and speed with which the companies should implement the efficiency 
savings that Ofgem has identified. This is the glidepath issue in designing price 
controls. 
II. REGULATORY THEORY AND THE FORM OF PRICE CONTROL 
The essence of UK utility regulation remains the RPI–X price-capping model. To 
a certain degree, the choice of X at privatisation might seem less important than 
the switch to price capping per se, since it will usually represent the first 
opportunity for the utility to respond to incentives. However, this assumes too UK Electricity Distribution Price Controls 
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readily that the interests of managers and shareholders are perfectly aligned. A 
lenient price cap may simply be taken by managers as a binding constraint rather 
than as a pure incentive. In fact, little attention has been given to whether the 
incentives in RPI–X regulation are as attractive to managers as they are to 
owners of the companies concerned. 
RPI–X regulation is designed to combat the moral hazard of utilities’ failure 
to exert cost-cutting efforts. From the shareholders’ point of view, they are the 
residual claimants to all efficiency savings, and efficiency savings are the only 
way of generating additional rewards. RPI–X regulation therefore has the 
potential to be a very effective form of incentive regulation. In practice, it has 
been frequently controversial and unexpectedly demanding to implement 
successfully. 
When the UK adopted price-cap regulation as its incentive mechanism for all 
privatised utilities, its original proponents recognised that resetting the X factor 
at regulatory review raised complex issues of how closely it should be related to 
the utility’s achieved performance without destroying incentives and how much 
it could be decoupled from that performance without raising populist objections. 
Beesley and Littlechild (1989) suggest that, in large-scale network industries 
where regional natural monopoly characteristics are important, it would be 
difficult to avoid relating the X factor to some measure of company performance, 
especially the rate of return on capital, and consequently yardstick performance 
measures would become extremely important. This is becoming widely 
recognised, and electricity network regulatory statements in the Netherlands and 
Australia are two recent examples of similar analysis (DTE, 1999; IPART, 
1999). 
Yardstick competition has been a well-established idea in the academic 
literature since Shleifer (1985). It requires that the regulator stipulate a price cap 
that is based on any cost information other than the firm’s own chosen cost level. 
This information reflects both current marginal cost and potential cost reduction. 
The cost information of the ‘shadow firm’ associated with the firm under 
regulation may reflect the mean performance of other identical firms or that of 
any other firm with appropriate allowance for exogenous differences. Bench-
marking in this context has a slightly different connotation. The application of 
yardstick competition is treated in two stages in regulatory applications: 
•  Firms are bench-marked against each other to determine an efficient frontier 
and then given different cost reduction targets to ensure that each catches up 
with the frontier over time. 
•  Subsequently, all of the firms in the group may be given the same cost 
reduction frontier (for example, the rate of total factor productivity growth in 
the economy as a whole) in order to implement yardstick competition. Fiscal Studies 
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III. RPI–X REGULATION IN PRACTICE 
The application of the price-cap idea in practice has raised issues of both 
analysis and measurement. The underlying principles of Ofgem’s approach are 
set out here. The critical issues are: 
•  What is the nature of the price that is capped?  
•  What is the basic model for choosing X?  
•  What is the form of the control that results? 
The Ofgem model targets an average revenue figure for distribution charges, 
()
t
t X RPI P M − + = 1 0 , 
and computes M on the basis of a 50 per cent split between average revenue per 
kWh-unit distributed and average revenue per customer served. The average in 
each case is weighted by voltage class of customer.
1 The purpose of this unit 
load and customer split was to overcome objections to the form of price control 
used in the first few years of privatisation when many environmental 
campaigners argued that, if only average revenue per unit distributed were 
capped, companies would have an incentive to increase load contrary to 
objectives of decreasing energy consumption for environmental reasons. 
The key ingredients in the model have become the P0 settlement, which is the 
initial price that is to form the basis for the future revenue flows of the utility 
from the start of the new control period, and the X factor implied in Ofgem’s 
projection of costs. The mechanics of this scheme as it operated in the 1999 
distribution price control review can be set out in the following steps. 
The companies are requested to report their operating costs at the beginning 
of the control period (t = 1), together with their capital expenditure projections 
up to the end of the control period (t = n). Two scenarios are used: existing 
quality of supply standards and enhanced quality of supply. Quality of supply is 
measured in terms of security (number of interruptions per customer) and 
availability (minutes of interruption per customer). 
Ofgem, together with appointed consultants, scrutinises the operating costs 
and the capital expenditure projections, and carries out a comparative efficiency 
analysis of the former while drawing up its own capital projections based on 
agreed guidelines about load growth (Q). The outcome is a set of operating and 
capital expenditure projections and depreciation of the network (OPEX, CAPEX 
and  D) that Ofgem believes reflects the efficiency frontier amongst the 
companies. Ofgem calculates the companies’ weighted average cost of capital 
(wacc = i) and a rolling series of opening regulatory asset values (Vt–1) and 
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closing values (Vt) by adding the capital expenditure flow and subtracting 
depreciation flow during the period to adjust the starting stock value: 
1 tt t t V V CAPEX D − =+ − . 
The overall purpose is to calibrate the discounted present value (PV) 
equation: 
) ( ) ( ) ( costs PV MQ PV revenues PV = ≡ . 
Explicitly, this reads 
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Consequently, the distribution price per unit of output may be considered as the 
sum of
2 
•  the allowed operating costs, OPEX; 
•  an allowance for depreciation of the regulatory asset base, D; and 
•  a return on the appropriate regulatory asset base, iV. 
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The incentives explicit in the Ofgem model can be illustrated as in Figure 1, 
in which two price control reviews, for 1995 and 2000, are shown, together with 
a pre-control initial price. The symbols are p* the price control, r* the forecast of 
allowable operating cost and k* the forecast of allowable capacity cost. The 
return on regulatory asset value is p*–(r*+k*). At the beginning of the first 
control period in 1995, the initial price is moved down by  0 p ∆  to take account of 
projected cost savings over the succeeding period. The shaded area shows the 
operating and capacity cost savings actually made by the company over the 
control period, r*(t)–r(t) and k*(t)–k(t). The company retains these benefits for 
shareholders. At the beginning of the second control period in 2000, new 
forecasts and a new initial price are set, with the one-off price reduction  0 p ∆  
now delivering to consumers the cost savings already achieved by the company. 
These one-off price reductions at the commencement of each new control period 
are referred to as P0 adjustments. In Figure 1, the focus is on a single utility, and 
all of the cost savings realised in a given period are passed to consumers in the 
P0 adjustment for the next period, so that the utility starts again from the 
beginning with a price control that reflects a return on the regulatory asset base 
equal to the weighted average cost of capital.  
FIGURE 1 
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IV. CRITICAL ISSUES FOR THE REGULATOR 
AND THE COMPANIES 
The brief description above of the mechanics of the UK price controls in 
electricity reveals substantive issues of dispute between the regulator and the 
companies. These concern: 
•  the allowed operating cost, OPEX; 
•  the glidepath of cost adjustment; 
•  the projected capital expenditure and related quality of supply targets, 
CAPEX; 
•  the resulting regulatory asset base, V; 
•  the weighted average cost of capital, i; and 
•  most importantly, the P0 adjustment for individual companies. 
The principal points at issue concern the way in which the cost projections for 
different companies are arrived at and the use that is made of them. In simple 
terms, what is the basis for choosing X and implementing different P0 values for 
different public electricity suppliers? The idea of bench-marking or yardstick 
comparisons immediately becomes inseparable from the decision about X and P0. 
The practice of making efficiency and productivity comparisons amongst 
public utilities has been strongly developed in the last few years, and most 
regulatory offices have provision for bench-marking the utilities under their 
remit. There are two areas of interest: comparing the efficiency of production 
amongst utilities at a specific point in time (efficiency analysis) and measuring 
the productivity growth of utilities over time (productivity analysis).  
Productivity change measures the rate of increase in outputs (yr) relative to 


















Under the assumption that output and input markets achieve productive 
efficiency (output prices equal to marginal cost, input prices equal to value of 
marginal product), the weights, wr and vi, applied to outputs and inputs are 
estimated by output and input shares in total revenue and costs, resulting in the  
 Fiscal Studies 
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discrete Tornqvist index. Productivity growth (the proportional rate of change of 
TFP) spills over to consumers in aggregate, and it represents the shift over time 
of the production correspondence between inputs and outputs, i.e. technological 
change. The underlying assumptions are unlikely to apply to the analysis of 
privatised utilities in network industries, both because of their residual market 
power and because of their known history of productive inefficiency under state 
ownership.  
Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994) indicate how TFP can incorporate 
efficiency change as well as technological change if a Malmquist index approach 
is used instead. This requires that the output and input weights are estimated 
directly, and the non-parametric programming methods of data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) are useful for this. Alternatively, stochastic frontier analysis 
(SFA) can be used to estimate the efficiency change component of productivity 
growth if relatively strong assumptions are made about the production function 
and error distribution. In both cases, a set of panel data on the outputs and inputs 
of different firms observed over time is needed. 
Several such measurement exercises have been carried out, and they are 
surveyed in Waddams Price (1999). For example, O’Mahony (1999) estimates 
that labour productivity in UK electricity supply rose at an annual rate of 7 per 
cent over the period 1990–96, while in comparison labour productivity in 
manufacturing rose by 3.5 per cent per year in the same period. Several other 
studies (for example, Burns and Weyman-Jones (1996) and Tilley and Weyman-
Jones (1999)) use SFA or mathematical programming (DEA) to evaluate this 
efficiency change in the regulated electricity distribution industry, with 
conflicting results. In the immediate aftermath of privatisation, productivity 
growth seemed not to differ markedly from pre-privatisation experience, but, 
following the 1994 control, considerable improvement can be seen. A model that 
is by now standard in the literature uses real operating expenditure and real value 
of the network capital stock (or alternatively transformer capacity and circuit 
length) as inputs and number of customers, units distributed and maximum 
demand as outputs, and allows for environmental variables such as quality of 
supply, customer density and market structure (high voltage share of 
distribution). For example, Tilley and Weyman-Jones (1999) show that, over the 
1990–98 period, companies have varied widely in performance, with three 
clusters averaging 8.5 per cent, 6 per cent and 5 per cent annual TFP growth. 
Productivity growth improved very substantially after 1994, and all of the 
measured TFP growth for the industry is concentrated on the shifting frontier, 
with none due to companies generally moving closer to the frontier. 
Ofgem (1999a) describes an efficiency frontier to bench-mark OPEX derived 
as follows. Collect operating cost data for each company and remove the non-
controllable items: UK Electricity Distribution Price Controls 
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Controllable operating cost (by Ofgem definition) 
= Operating cost – Network depreciation – Network rates 
– National Grid Company exit charges 
– Profit (or loss) on sale of fixed assets. 
Standardise these for different accounting procedures amongst companies and 
then adjust for regionally differing wage rates. The resulting figure, C, is ‘base 
operating costs’. These are assumed to be a combination of a fixed cost and a 
constant-returns-to-scale (CRS) Cobb–Douglas function of customers (N), units 
distributed (U) and network length (L): 
γ β α L U BN A C + = . 
Instead of carrying out a multiple regression, compute for each company (j) a 



































Here, u is units per customer and l is network length per customer, and du and dl 
are the deviations from the sample means, u and l . The parameters b and g are 
chosen by Ofgem to be 0.25 in both cases. Regress 
*
1 0 j j N a a C + = , as 
illustrated in Figure 2. The (average) regression through the means excludes the 
data on the frontier companies. Now Ofgem constructs a line starting at the 
regression intercept just calculated and passing through the lowest observations. 
This is Ofgem’s ‘efficiency frontier’. It is not based on one of the usual frontier 
estimation methods; in particular, it is not equivalent to corrected ordinary least 
squares, although it does appear to provide a ranking of companies quite similar 
to the rankings produced by other studies that do use conventional frontier 
estimation methods (for example, Tilley and Weyman-Jones (1999)). 
The use made of this efficiency study
4 by Ofgem takes two forms. It appears 
to be critical in setting the X factor and to be critical in setting the allowed 
operating costs of the individual companies. In what follows, I attempt to set out 
how the process seems to have worked in Ofgem’s price control proposals. The 
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Ofgem documents are not the model of clarity that might be expected, perhaps 
because the final controls are in some sense an outcome of bargains with the 
regulated companies. Beesley and Littlechild (1989) cite this as one of the 
advantages of the RPI–X model. What follows is therefore an attempt to make 
coherent sense of documents that may not be intended to be entirely transparent 
(something in which they succeed admirably). Figure 3 illustrates the general 
approach.  
FIGURE 2 
Ofgem’s Average and Frontier Regressions 
FIGURE 3 
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Ofgem decided to apply a single X factor of 3 per cent to all the companies. 
The arguments for allocating the revenue reduction between P0 and X are finely 
balanced (Ofgem, 1999c, pp. 48–9). Customers were assumed to prefer larger 
immediate price cuts and companies to prefer financial profiles that did not 
deteriorate over time. High levels of X might be unsustainable, but low levels of 
X could underestimate the scope for efficiency gains. The inefficiency of the 
typical company relative to the OPEX frontier companies is to be eliminated 
over the next control period. The range of inefficiencies is from zero to 40 per 
cent, with an average of about 20 per cent (Ofgem, 1999a, p. 33; Ofgem, 1999b, 
p. 24). Over the seven years from the date of the Ofgem (1999a) study (1997–98) 
to the end of the next control period (2004–05), the companies, with some 
allowed adjustments, should be able to eliminate the average level of 
inefficiency (Ofgem, 1999a, pp. 35–6). This produces an X factor of 
approximately 3 per cent per year for the next control period, used in the Ofgem 
(1999c) analysis. This is illustrated in Figure 3 by the link between n and nX; the 
diagram crystallises the glidepath issue. However, the inefficiency ratings for 
each company are also used to reduce its projected controllable operating costs 
for the next control period. For the frontier companies, this means that they must 
continue to reduce prices each year of the next control by the average annual rate 
of cost reduction needed to reduce the average level of inefficiency in the 1997–
98 operating costs to zero (approximately X = 3 per cent per year). For the 
inefficient companies above the frontier in 1997–98, their individual levels of 
allowed operating cost are also to be reduced by all of the measured inefficiency 
in the 1997–98 costs. Adding in the projected non-controllable costs gives a 
profile of allowed operating cost (OPEX) for each company over the next control 
period. The rate of cost reduction each year is referred to as the cost ‘glidepath’.
5 
In negotiation with the companies, Ofgem has made adjustments to the projected 
costs but increased the gradient of the glidepath from its initial smooth profile 
over seven years by requiring that three-quarters of the cost inefficiency of a 
company is eliminated in the first two years of the next control (Ofgem, 1999b, 
p. 25; Ofgem, 1999c). 
It is these projections, together with Ofgem’s adjustments to the companies’ 
capital expenditure projections, that make up the components of the discounted 
present value of costs. The third critical issue in the Ofgem model was therefore 
the nature of the allowed CAPEX provisions. Ofgem (1999c, pp. 30–1) 
demonstrates huge cyclical swings over the period 1950–90, with annual 
industry distribution CAPEX totals varying from less than £0.5 billion to more 
than £2 billion in constant 1997–98 prices. Initial input into the process was the 
company forecasts for their CAPEX over the review period, and this was bench-
marked by Ofgem in two categories — load-related (LRE), driven by new 
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customer connections and load growth, and non-load-related (NLRE), driven by 
replacement, information gathering, network control and quality of supply 
(Ofgem, 1999a, pp. 41–52). This led to final downward revisions of 13 per cent 
(£0.95 billion) to the companies’ aggregated forecasts for the review period, 
2000–05. However, some companies had much higher downward revisions than 
others, mainly arising under non-load-related expenditure, and, in particular, the 
company with the largest downward revision of its forecast CAPEX was also the 
company that performed second worst on the OPEX bench-marking exercise. 
Following the start of the new controls, this company disposed of its supply 
business in a general cost-cutting exercise.  
Just prior to the final proposals, the regulator toyed with the idea of applying 
yardstick incentives to the companies’ CAPEX behaviour and quality of supply 
targets (Ofgem, 1999b, annexes C, D and E). For example, two possible 
yardstick mechanisms for CAPEX were suggested. The first increased the 
revenue cap by between 0.25 and 0.5 of a percentage point if the increase in a 
company’s asset base between 1994 and 1999 was less than 5 per cent, but 
reduced it if the capital base had increased by more than 10 per cent. The second 
suggested mechanism involved calculating the industry-wide ratio between 
NLRE and the modern equivalent asset value of the network (4.4 per cent in 
fact) and increasing or reducing each company’s revenue cap according to 
whether its actual NLRE in 1995–99 fell short of or exceeded this yardstick 
NLRE value. Despite these attempts to develop yardstick mechanisms to avoid 
rewarding excessive past CAPEX, it is not clear that the final proposals made 
explicit use of them. 
The capital expenditure projections minus the depreciation projections are 
added to the previous period’s closing value of distribution business assets to 
produce the regulatory asset value, which in turn produces the allowed return 
when multiplied by the weighted average cost of capital. The opening asset value 
follows from previous price controls and was initially based on uprated market 
valuations of the individual companies from the end of the first day’s trading at 
flotation (OFFER, 1994). Ofgem took the view that it was necessary to remain 
consistent over different review periods in the way that the regulatory asset value 
was calculated so as to avoid regulatory risk (Ofgem, 1999b, p. 75). The real pre-
tax weighted average cost of capital has been calculated on a conventional basis 
for a number of years and incorporates risk-adjusted equity and debt rates. It has 
varied between 6 per cent and 7.5 per cent in the different controls applied to the 
energy utilities and was set at 6.5 per cent for the 1999 final proposals (Ofgem, 
1999c, p. 43). In summary, it is 
wacc = δ  (real risk-free cost of debt + drp) 
+ ε  (real risk-free cost of equity + erp)β  (1.4),  UK Electricity Distribution Price Controls 
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where drp is the debt risk premium, erp is the equity risk premium, δ   and ε  are 
gearing ratios both set at 50 per cent, β  is the equity beta on the distribution 
companies and 1.4 is the tax wedge applied to equity finance to account for 
corporation tax. β  is set at 1.0 to reflect ‘the low risk nature of the distribution 
business which has the characteristics of a natural monopoly’ (Ofgem, 1999c, p. 
41). 
A cost glidepath is only one of the options available to the regulator of 
electricity network service, and both Australian (IPART, 1999) and Dutch (DTE, 
1999) regulatory offices have considered P0 glidepaths. The issue is whether all 
of the achieved cost savings of a utility in the previous period should be 
recouped by customers at the beginning of the new control in the form of the 
one-off adjustment to P0. Australian regulators in particular (IPART, 1999) have 
considered a glidepath for the P0 adjustment that spans part or all of the next 
control period. The reason for this is to leave some further incentive reward to 
the efficient companies beyond the start of the next period. Ofgem has rejected 
this idea and maintained the objective of passing all of a company’s achieved 
cost savings back to its customers at the start of the next control period. Consider 
two companies: one is frontier efficient and the other has the average level of 
cost inefficiency based on costs measured just prior to the start of the next 
control period, say 20 per cent as in Figure 3. The efficient company has cost 
savings of 20 per cent to pass on to consumers immediately, and must then lower 
prices by say X = 3 per cent in real terms during the control. If it can do better, it 
keeps the cost savings until the next control starts. The inefficient firm has no 
achieved cost savings to pass on to consumers, but it must subsequently reduce 
its costs by the X = 3 per cent factor and the 20 per cent built into the allowable 
operating costs used to calculate P0. It has a much tougher target to meet before 
it becomes residual claimant to its cost savings, but it could conceivably have a 
smaller P0 fall in the regulated price than the frontier efficient firm. This does 
appear to have been the outcome, since the two most efficient frontier companies 
on OPEX bench-marking were given P0 cuts of 28 per cent and 19 per cent, 
while the three least efficient had P0 cuts of 21–24 per cent. The draft and final 
proposals, although positively correlated, did differ in level and distribution 
amongst the companies, suggesting considerable last-minute bargaining between 
Ofgem and the companies over the outcome. 
V. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
IN YARDSTICK REGULATION 
Ofgem has not been alone in carrying out this yardstick and incentive-based 
distribution price control. Norway has been trying out DEA-based yardstick 
mechanisms for some time, and a similar mechanism to the Ofgem model can be 
seen in the work of the Dutch regulator (DTE, 2000). In the latter case, total 
costs were bench-marked using a DEA model with constant returns to scale. The Fiscal Studies 
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value of the companies’ assets (regulatory asset base) and the weighted average 
cost of capital were derived from financial models reflecting the circumstances 
of the deregulation of the companies, and P0 and X factors were derived. Since 
the  P0 figures were heavily constrained by the legislative form of the 
deregulation, more weight was given to the X factors. These were capped at 8 per 
cent but differed significantly amongst companies, in part because of their 
distance from the DEA-CRS efficient frontier. This control is due to last until 
2003, when it may be replaced by an explicit yardstick mechanism that bases X 
on national total factor productivity growth. 
In fact, throughout Europe, there is growing interest in this form of price 
control for distribution networks. An informal group of European regulators has 
discussed the possibility of constructing internationally comparable databases for 
yardstick regulation using the model described here. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Ofgem’s responsibility is to set price controls for public electricity suppliers and 
to foster competition, and these tasks should be considered together. In fostering 
competition, Ofgem has liberalised the supply market in both retail gas and 
electricity, and a significant trend in customer switching has already been 
observed according to Ofgem press statements, which suggest that up to one-
quarter of customers have switched supplier. In the generation function, Ofgem 
has made substantial changes to the existing trading arrangements. Its explicit 
price controls apply to network services, and here, as we have seen, it has 
introduced three principal ideas. The present value equation of revenues and 
costs with a predetermined discount rate is used to determine P0 adjustments that 
transfer all of the achieved efficiency savings to customers without a price 
glidepath. A yardstick efficiency comparison based on controllable operating 
costs is carried out both to set allowed operating costs and to suggest an X factor. 
Finally, a cost glidepath with a non-linear gradient is used to project allowed 
operating and capital costs in the discounted present value equation to determine 
the P0 adjustment, which transfers achieved savings to consumers. The nature of 
the yardstick comparisons and the way they are used in the analysis are not as 
transparent as they could be, and ongoing bargaining seems to characterise the 
evolution of the controls. The control process is becoming more involved with 
every period that passes, and in no sense is regulation likely to disappear or 
diminish for network service providers. Indeed, Ofgem has indicated that 
ongoing monitoring of the regulatory framework, with an emphasis on ensuring 
that quality of supply is not endangered by price capping, is the next 
development. This suggests the need for incentive mechanisms applying to the 
medium-term performance of the network. In 2000–01, Ofgem began to develop 
its Information and Incentives Project (IIP) (Ofgem, 2000 and 2001), which is a 
complete re-examination of the incentives toward meeting quality of supply UK Electricity Distribution Price Controls 
247 
targets and determining CAPEX profiles; this is likely to be the centre of 
regulatory attention over the next few years. 
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